ai-integration
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Path traversal vulnerability in
scripts/generate.ts. The script uses the user-providednameargument to construct target file paths usingpath.joinwithout sanitization, allowing for arbitrary file writes (e.g., using../../sequences) outside the intended directories. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Dynamic script loading from a relative path. The
scripts/generate.tsscript imports a template engine from a relative path (../create-crud-app-template/scripts/template-engine.ts), creating a dependency on external skill files that could be manipulated to execute unintended logic. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Risk of indirect prompt injection in generated code. 1. Ingestion points:
input.messagesandinput.promptinrouter.hbs. 2. Boundary markers: Absent in system prompts. 3. Capability inventory: Generated routers facilitate LLM calls with streaming and tool-calling. 4. Sanitization: Absent for message content. - [SAFE]: The skill follows security best practices for credential management by instructing users to use environment variables and a dedicated secrets management skill instead of hardcoding API keys.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata