agent-memory-mcp
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): The skill requires cloning a repository from an untrusted source (
https://github.com/webzler/agentMemory.git). This source is not on the trusted list and lacks verification. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The installation process involves running
npm installandnpm run compileon the untrusted code, followed bynpm run start-server. This provides a path for arbitrary code execution on the host machine. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill implements a persistent memory system that is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
memory_writetool, which stores strings from any source the agent processes (e.g., external web content). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions or delimiters to prevent the agent from obeying commands stored within the memory content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has file-write capabilities (syncing with documentation) and persistent storage. Maliciously crafted memories can influence any future agent decision that relies on
memory_searchormemory_readoutputs. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of validation or filtering for executable instructions within stored memories.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata