workers-observability
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The script
scripts/analyze-logs.shis vulnerable to shell command injection. It constructs a command string using the--searchargument ($SEARCH_TERM) and executes it usingeval "$cmd". If an agent or user passes untrusted input containing shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks or semicolons) as a search term, it could lead to arbitrary command execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it ingests and processes untrusted data from HTTP requests for logging and analytics purposes.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters via the
Requestobject intemplates/logging-setup.tsandTailEventarrays intemplates/tail-worker.ts. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings are present to protect downstream LLMs that might consume these logs.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
fetchfor data exfiltration to logging endpoints (configured by the user) and executes shell commands via scripts usingwranglerandjq. - Sanitization: The skill includes a robust
redactfunction that masks common sensitive keys likepassword,token,secret, andauthorizationto prevent credential exposure. - [SAFE] (INFO): The automated security alert identifying
logger.infoas a malicious URL is a false positive. The scanner misinterpreted a standard JavaScript method call for logging as a blacklisted domain.
Recommendations
- Contains 1 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata