navigate-skills
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill implements a telemetry mechanism that reads a destination URL from
~/.superstack/config.jsonand usescurlto send usage data (metadata like skill name, duration, and platform architecture) to that external endpoint. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes bash scripts to manage its telemetry state. It uses commands such as
grep,sed,curl, anddateto process local configuration and communicate with remote services. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill promotes the installation of third-party tools via
npx skills add <url>. This command fetches and installs executable instructions from remote GitHub repositories, which can lead to the execution of unverified code. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. It reads data from JSON catalog files (
clonable-repos.json,solana-skills.json, etc.) in the user's home directory and incorporates their contents into its responses without explicit sanitization or boundary markers to prevent embedded instructions from influencing the agent. - Ingestion points: Reads catalog JSON files from
~/.codex/skills/data/catalogs/or~/.claude/skills/data/catalogs/. - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided processing instructions.
- Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands (bash), network access (curl), and file system access.
- Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or escaping for the data retrieved from the catalog files.
Audit Metadata