qzcli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the
qzcli_toolfrom a third-party GitHub repository (github.com/tianyilt/qzcli_tool) that is not recognized as a trusted vendor in the current context.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill provides examples of passing sensitive passwords directly as command-line arguments (e.g.,qzcli login -u ... -p '...'), which can expose credentials in shell history logs or system process listings.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The tool manages authentication credentials in local configuration files (~/.qzcli/.envandconfig.json).\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary commands on the remote compute platform via theqzcli create --commandflag, controlled by the agent.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and displays potentially untrusted metadata from the Qizhi platform.\n - Ingestion points:
qzcli res -u(fetches workspace and resource names) andqzcli ls(fetches job details).\n - Boundary markers: None present to separate platform data from instructions.\n
- Capability inventory:
Bash(*)tool access and filesystemWriteaccess.\n - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of strings retrieved from the platform is mentioned.
Audit Metadata