result-to-claim

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute various shell commands using the Bash(*) tool, including running project-specific scripts such as python3 tools/research_wiki.py and tools/save_trace.sh. Broad bash access allows for arbitrary system interaction.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The workflow includes instructions to execute commands on remote servers via SSH (e.g., ssh server "tail -100 /path/to/training.log"). This pattern allows the agent to interact with and execute code on external infrastructure.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to fetch data from external services, specifically Weights & Biases (W&B), using patterns like wandb.Api().run("<entity>/<project>/<run_id>").history(). This involves transmitting identifiers and potentially credentials to a remote API.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing data from files and remote sources and interpolating them into LLM prompts.
  • Ingestion points: Content is read from EXPERIMENT_LOG.md, EXPERIMENT_TRACKER.md, docs/research_contract.md, remote log files via SSH, and W&B experiment history.
  • Boundary markers: While the prompt for the Codex sub-agent uses structural headers (e.g., 'Experiments run:', 'Results:'), it lacks explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore malicious instructions embedded within the ingested experimental data or logs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses Bash(*), Write, and Edit capabilities, and triggers local script executions (research_wiki.py).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of data sanitization or validation performed on the external metrics or log content before inclusion in the reasoning process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 19, 2026, 03:14 AM