doc-skill-generator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes data from external, untrusted sources (websites and PDFs).
  • Ingestion points: lib/crawler.js (retrieves web content via Playwright) and lib/pdf-reader.js (downloads and parses PDF text).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. While content is structured into Markdown files in the docs/ directory, there are no explicit delimiters or instructions telling the AI to ignore embedded commands within that content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write files (fs.writeFileSync, fs.cpSync), delete files (fs.rmSync), and execute shell commands (child_process.execFileSync to call the Playwright tool).
  • Sanitization: Content extracted from documents is not sanitized for natural language instructions that might influence the Agent's behavior during the skill generation or analysis phase.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads external PDF files from user-provided URLs using the lib/pdf-reader.js module. It uses the standard http and https modules to fetch these files into a temporary directory for processing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local commands to interact with the Playwright tool and perform file system operations.
  • Subprocess execution: lib/crawler.js uses execFileSync to invoke the playwright skill's tool.js for web scraping.
  • File system operations: tool.js and lib/generator.js perform significant file system operations including creating directories, writing generated code and documentation, and copying or deleting files in the installation target path.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 7, 2026, 07:34 PM