The Agent Skills Directory

[Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill lacks sufficient boundary markers or sanitization when processing article content. An attacker could embed instructions within an article to manipulate the agent's behavior during the 'Analyze Content' or 'Generate Outline' steps.
Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent via file paths or direct text pasting in SKILL.md (Step 1.1).
Boundary markers: Absent. The skill instructions do not specify the use of delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple backticks with 'ignore' warnings) to isolate the article content from the agent's operational instructions.
Capability inventory: The skill has significant write/execute capabilities, including modifying original markdown files (Step 1.4), creating new directories and files (Step 5.1, 6.1), and invoking external 'Generation Skills' (Step 5.2).
Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering of the input content before it is processed by the LLM to identify core arguments and illustration positions.
[Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill uses shell-like logic for configuration detection and file management.
Evidence: SKILL.md (Step 1.5) uses test -f and echo commands to locate EXTEND.md. While these specific instances are for configuration, the pattern of suggesting the agent run shell commands based on its own reasoning over article content (Step 6.1) increases the attack surface for command injection if the agent interprets the 'Position' or 'Visual Content' fields maliciously.

baoyu-article-illustrator