baoyu-post-to-wechat
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): Untrusted Remote Script Loading. The file
scripts/md/utils/languages.tsdynamically downloads JavaScript modules fromcdn-doocs.oss-cn-shenzhen.aliyuncs.comusingimport(). This CDN is not in the trusted scope, and loading remote scripts at runtime creates a high risk of code injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): UI Automation and Keystroke Injection. The script
scripts/paste-from-clipboard.tsexecutes powerful system-level tools (osascript,powershell.exe,xdotool) to simulate keyboard events (Cmd+V / Ctrl+V). If an attacker influences the agent via Indirect Prompt Injection, this capability could be abused to interact with any application running on the host system. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): Runtime Package Execution. The skill documentation and
md-to-wechat.tsrecommend or usenpx -y bunfor script execution.npxautomatically downloads and executes packages from the npm registry, which can be exploited if package names or the execution environment are compromised. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): Arbitrary File Fetching.
scripts/md-to-wechat.tsimplements adownloadFilefunction that fetches content from any URL provided in the input Markdown. This presents a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) risk if the agent is directed to process internal or malicious URLs. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): Subprocess Spawning. The skill relies on
spawnSyncto execute helper scripts and OS commands. While many paths are local, the interaction with external tools and the lack of strict input sanitization increase the overall attack surface.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata