computer-use-agents
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
AnthropicComputerUseclass implements a_handle_bashmethod that usessubprocess.run(command, shell=True). This allows the AI agent to execute arbitrary shell commands. While a basic blacklist of 'dangerous patterns' is included (e.g.,rm -rf), this is easily bypassed using shell aliases, different flags, or command concatenation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
SandboxedAgentclass usessubprocess.run(cmd, shell=True)where the command is constructed using string formatting. If theSandboxConfigparameters were to be influenced by untrusted external data, this could lead to command injection on the host system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to capture screenshots and provide them to a vision-language model for reasoning. This creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in a web page or application UI can hijack the agent's behavior. The skill itself acknowledges this risk in the 'Sharp Edges' section.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The implementation includes tools for reading and editing files (
str_replace_editor). An agent compromised via indirect prompt injection could use these tools to read sensitive local files and then exfiltrate them by typing the data into a web form, sending it via thebashtool, or displaying it on screen to be captured in logs. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
ComputerUseAgentloop dynamically parses JSON actions from the LLM's response usingjson.loadsand regex. These actions directly map to executable system operations likeclick,type, andkey, effectively executing model-generated logic on the system level.
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