github-workflow-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data that could contain malicious instructions designed to manipulate the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Pull request diffs (SKILL.md, Section 1.1) and issue titles/bodies (SKILL.md, Section 2.1) are passed directly into AI prompts.
- Boundary markers: The prompt templates lack explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the diff or issue content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the AI's output to perform actions like
github.rest.pulls.createReview,github.rest.issues.addLabels, andgithub.rest.issues.createComment. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the input data before it is interpolated into the prompt.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides automation for sensitive Git operations that modify repository state.
- Evidence: Section 4.1 contains a workflow that performs
git rebaseandgit push --force-with-leasetriggered by repository comments. - Evidence: Section 4.2 describes a
smartCherryPickfunction that executes shell commands using variables derived from commit information. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill includes patterns for modifying administrative repository settings.
- Evidence: Section 6.2 provides a script template to update branch protection rules (
github.rest.repos.updateBranchProtection), which requires high-level administrative permissions and can alter the security posture of the repository.
Audit Metadata