atlassian-skills
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- Unverifiable Dependencies (MEDIUM): The skill relies on a missing internal module
scripts/_common.py, which is imported by every functional script. This missing file contains the core logic for the Atlassian client, credential processing (AtlassianCredentials), and the actual execution of network requests. Without this code, it is impossible to verify if the skill securely handles API tokens or if it includes hidden data exfiltration logic. - Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill is designed to ingest and process large amounts of untrusted data from external sources, creating a significant vulnerability surface.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/confluence_pages.py(page content),scripts/jira_search.py(issue descriptions/fields), andscripts/bitbucket_files.py(source code content). - Boundary markers: None. Data retrieved from APIs is passed directly to the agent without delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: Extensive write permissions including
confluence_create_page,jira_transition_issue,jira_add_worklog, andconfluence_add_comment. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of external content is performed before returning it to the agent context.
- Data Exposure (LOW): The
.env.examplefile contains references to a specific organization's infrastructure (https://jira.sil.org). While these are not active credentials, the inclusion of specific target URLs in a general skill template is a security best-practice violation that could lead to reconnaissance or misconfiguration.
Audit Metadata