tmux-remote-worker-setup

Warn

Audited by Socket on Apr 13, 2026

2 alerts found:

Securityx2
SecurityMEDIUM
scripts/setup_remote_worker_from_tmux.sh

The fragment is an automation/deployment script but contains a critical high-risk pattern: it fetches a proxy bootstrap script over plain HTTP and immediately `eval`s it, which is equivalent to remote code execution if the network response is tampered with. Additionally, it deploys local $CODEX_HOME contents (including .env and feishu_notify.py) to remote hosts and runs remote setup/install steps without integrity verification, and it alters /etc/hosts to redirect a specific domain. Overall, this is not a safe supply-chain library-like component; it is operationally dangerous in untrusted environments and should be reviewed/mitigated (remove eval-over-HTTP, pin/verify payloads, avoid shipping secrets).

Confidence: 65%Severity: 78%
SecurityMEDIUM
SKILL.md

SUSPICIOUS. The core remote-worker setup behavior is broadly consistent with the stated purpose, but the skill has two major security issues: executing an unverifiable remote proxy script via eval/curl over plain HTTP, and copying local Codex secret/config files onto the remote worker. Those behaviors make the skill high risk even without clear proof of malicious intent.

Confidence: 90%Severity: 83%
Audit Metadata
Analyzed At
Apr 13, 2026, 08:40 AM
Package URL
pkg:socket/skills-sh/simingh124%2Fskills%2Ftmux-remote-worker-setup%2F@609150814d1b17d3abe7344829de380264f6b618