skills/simota/agent-skills/nexus/Gen Agent Trust Hub

nexus

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is built to execute and manage sub-agent sessions and system commands (e.g., git status, log) through platform-specific tools like Agent and spawn_agent across various execution layers.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructions throughout the skill (SKILL.md, references/execution-phases.md, references/orchestration-patterns.md) mandate the use of mode: bypassPermissions. This setting allows sub-agents to perform tool operations without the standard user confirmation prompts, reducing oversight of potentially sensitive actions.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: As a meta-orchestrator, the skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It processes untrusted user input and project data, which is then decomposed and passed as context to other specialist agents. The skill lacks explicit sanitization or filtering logic for these interpolated prompts, relying instead on its internal guardrail system (L1-L4) to detect failures after they occur.
  • Ingestion points: User requests and project-state data (SKILL.md, references/proactive-mode.md).
  • Boundary markers: Uses structured _STEP_COMPLETE and NEXUS_HANDOFF blocks to delimit agent communications, which provides some structure but does not prevent malicious instruction propagation.
  • Capability inventory: Extensive capability to read/write files and execute tools via the Agent tool and shell commands across multiple scripts.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of input sanitization or escaping before passing context to sub-agents.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 22, 2026, 01:58 PM