web-search

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content extracted from external URLs through Tavily and Exa extractors, which can then be passed to downstream LLMs.
  • Ingestion points: Data extracted from arbitrary URLs via tavily/extract and exa/extract apps (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The documentation suggests using XML-style tags like <content> and <search-results> for delimitation, which provides basic but non-robust protection against embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes Bash(belt *) to execute platform applications, write to local files (e.g., search_results.json), and chain outputs to other LLM apps.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the extracted web content is documented before it is interpolated into subsequent prompts.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external installation scripts and package additions from the service provider's infrastructure.
  • Evidence: Provides instructions to install the belt CLI via npx skills add belt-sh/cli and refers to a setup guide hosted at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md (SKILL.md).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution via the belt CLI to interact with remote search and extraction services.
  • Evidence: Instructions frequently use belt app run commands to process queries and URLs (SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 18, 2026, 08:44 PM