counselors

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a Bash script in Phase 4 that automatically sources environment files including .env from the current working directory. If a malicious .env file exists in the directory where the skill is run, it can execute arbitrary shell commands with the user's privileges.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The README instructs users to install a global NPM package directly from a specific GitHub fork (github:skinnyandbald/counselors) rather than a verified package registry or a trusted organization's repository.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill automatically gathers project context, including git diff outputs and file contents, and transmits them to the OpenRouter API. This poses a risk of exposing sensitive data, credentials, or proprietary code that may be present in the repository's history or local files.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the local filesystem (files and git diffs) and interpolates it directly into prompts sent to multiple AI agents. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious comments or code could influence the agent's synthesis or recommendation phase.
  • Ingestion points: Phase 1 (Files and git diff output).
  • Boundary markers: Lacks explicit 'ignore embedded instructions' delimiters for the gathered context.
  • Capability inventory: Phase 4 (Subprocess execution of counselors CLI).
  • Sanitization: No filtering or sanitization of ingested content before prompt interpolation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 13, 2026, 01:06 AM