distil
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the installation of third-party extensions from unverified sources. In the pre-flight check, it suggests installing skills from GitHub users 'bencium', 'connorads', and 'lobbi-docs' using the 'npx skills add' command. These sources are not included in the trusted vendor list.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The resolution strategy for missing dependencies involves executing shell commands that download and integrate external code ('npx skills add ... -g -y'). This pattern allows for the execution of remote code from unverified origins if the user accepts the installation prompt.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of system commands through subagents to initialize projects, install npm packages, and manage a development server. It generates and runs a full Vite/React application, which involves executing dynamically created source code.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from local files or external URLs to drive code generation.
- Ingestion points: Site specifications are read via the '--spec' flag, and external website content is retrieved using the '--url' flag (WebFetch).
- Boundary markers: The prompts used for the code-generation subagents lack explicit boundary markers or instructions to treat the ingested data as untrusted, increasing the risk that malicious instructions in the source data could influence the generated output.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities including file system modification, network fetching, and shell command execution.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization before the external content is interpolated into subagent prompts for creating '.tsx' files.
Audit Metadata