using-vit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
vitCLI tool, executing various commands such asvit init,vit skim,vit ship, andvit remixto perform its tasks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates network operations through the
vitCLI. Specifically,vit skimfetches records from the ATProto network, andvit beaconprobes remote repositories (potentially usinggit cloneor similar mechanisms) to identify project markers. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it ingests untrusted data from an external source (ATProto) and incorporates it into the agent's workflow.
- Ingestion points: The
vit skimcommand reads records from followed accounts, andvit remixoutputs the content of external 'caps' (software capabilities) directly into the agent's context for implementation planning. - Boundary markers: The skill documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the ingested 'cap' content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write to the network via
vit ship, modify local configurations viavit config, and generate code/plans viavit remix. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the external content before it is processed by the agent.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While the skill primarily shares 'software capabilities', the
vit shipcommand publishes data to a public decentralized network. If the agent is tricked into including sensitive information in a 'cap' body, it would result in public data exposure.
Audit Metadata