codex-plan-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the
@openai/codexCLI tool globally using npm. This package is maintained by OpenAI, which is a recognized trusted organization. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Shell commands are utilized for creating unique review IDs, generating temporary JSON schemas in
/tmp, and executing the Codex CLI. The skill validates the generatedREVIEW_IDusing a regex pattern (^[0-9]{8}-[0-9]{6}-[0-9a-f]{6}$) before use, which prevents potential path traversal attacks during file operations in the temporary directory. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features an indirect prompt injection surface because it reads external project files (
spec.md,prd.json) and passes their content to a remote model. Maliciously crafted content within these documentation files could attempt to override the agent's instructions during the review process. This risk is addressed by explicit instructions for the agent to exercise independent judgment and by the presence of a user-controlled feedback loop. - Ingestion points: Content is read from
spec.md,prd.json, andbrainstorm.mdwithin the user-provided${PLAN_FOLDER}(referenced in SKILL.md Steps 2, 3, and 6b). - Boundary markers: The file content is contained within heredoc blocks during the
codex execcall, though no specific isolation delimiters or "ignore instructions" tags are used for the content itself. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for network interaction via
codex execand local file system modifications viagit checkoutand direct file writes (referenced in SKILL.md Steps 3, 5, and 6). - Sanitization: While the script-generated
REVIEW_IDis strictly validated, the text content within the plan files is not sanitized or escaped before being included in the prompt.
Audit Metadata