biome-gritql

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted project data while possessing the capability to modify files and execute shell commands.
  • Ingestion points: Project files and codebase contents accessed via the Read and Glob tools.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in the code it is linting.
  • Capability inventory: High-privilege access including Bash (for running linter checks) and Write/Edit (for creating/modifying rule files and project configurations).
  • Sanitization: None. The skill does not specify any validation or filtering of external content before processing it for linting rules.
  • External Downloads (Category 4) (LOW): The skill instructions suggest using bunx biome check, which triggers the download and execution of the @biomejs/biome package from the npm registry.
  • Command Execution (Category 5) (MEDIUM): The skill requests Bash access to run linter commands, which could be exploited if the agent is tricked into executing malicious strings via indirect injection.
  • Metadata Poisoning (Category 7) (MEDIUM): The resources section includes a link to an external personal blog (laulau.land) for 'Blog examples'. Directing an agent to read instructions from untrusted, non-official external sources increases the risk of the agent adopting malicious patterns or behavior-overriding instructions.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 12:35 AM