preqstation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper script
scripts/preqstation-api.shuses theevalcommand within thepreq_review_taskfunction to execute test, build, and lint commands provided as arguments. This pattern allows for the execution of arbitrary shell strings. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mddirect the agent to autonomously perform git actions includinggit commit,git push, and creating pull requests based on deployment strategies fetched from the remote API. It explicitly tells the agent not to stop for user approval during these operations. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the local file
~/.preqstation-dispatch/projects.jsonto read and manage project path mappings on the user's filesystem. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Work results, implementation summaries, and QA reports—which may contain sensitive information about the codebase—are transmitted to a user-configured remote API endpoint via
curland MCP tools. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes task titles, notes, acceptance criteria, and comments retrieved from the PREQSTATION API. Although it contains instructions to prioritize task notes over comments and to ignore specific helper blocks, the agent could still be influenced by malicious instructions embedded in the task data. Evidence found in
SKILL.mdandscripts/preqstation-api.shregarding ingestion points likepreq_get_taskandpreq_get_task_comment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in
docs/artifact-publishing.mdreferences the use of an external MCP server provided by Fast.io (https://mcp.fast.io/mcp) for publishing work artifacts.
Audit Metadata