inbox
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Shell command injection vulnerabilities exist in multiple modes where user-provided input is directly interpolated into bash commands. In Mode 1 (Read), the instruction
ls -1t "$INBOX"/*<topic>*.mduses the<topic>placeholder directly within a shell glob, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands using metacharacters (e.g.,;,|,&). In Mode 2 (Write), the logicSLUG=$(echo "<topic>" | ...)is also vulnerable; because the placeholder is placed inside double quotes within anechocommand, it remains susceptible to command substitution (e.g.,$(...)or backticks). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes and displays content from a shared directory that can be modified by other users or agents.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads the full content of all
.mdfiles located in theψ/inbox/directory via the/inbox readcommands. - Boundary markers: None; the skill does not use delimiters or provide the agent with instructions to ignore embedded commands within the inbox items.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities including file system modification (reading, writing, and moving files), directory creation, and arbitrary shell command execution.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the actual content of the files being read from the inbox.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata