oracle-family-scan
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdinterpolate variables like$QUERYand$ARGUMENTSdirectly into shell commands (e.g.,bun $MOTHER/registry/query.ts "$QUERY"). This pattern creates a surface for command injection if the agent does not properly sanitize or escape user-provided input before execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The "welcome" flow (Mode 9) creates an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data from external sources to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Reads issue titles, bodies, and author names from the
Soul-Brews-Studio/arra-oracle-v3repository usinggh issue view(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None. There are no instructions or delimiters to help the agent distinguish between administrative metadata and potentially malicious instructions embedded in the birth stories.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
bunfor local script execution andghfor network operations, including posting comments and GraphQL mutations to GitHub. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the fetched text before the agent is asked to "reference specific metaphor + phrases" and "NOT be templated".
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill frequently uses the
ghCLI and GraphQL API to fetch data from GitHub repositories belonging to the author (Soul-Brews-Studio) and related organizations. It also recommends usingghq getto clone the central registry repository if not present locally.
Audit Metadata