talk-to

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an autonomous conversation loop (Mode 4) that ingests data from external agents via the oracle_thread_read tool without boundary markers or sanitization. This establishes a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious input from another agent could influence the behavior or output of the current agent.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Mandatory evidence chain for indirect prompt injection surface: Ingestion points: oracle_thread_read tool (SKILL.md); Boundary markers: Absent; Capability inventory: oracle_thread, oracle_threads, and oracle_thread_read; Sanitization: Absent.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Instructions explicitly direct the agent to 'do NOT ask the user what to say' and to post immediately based on inferred intent. This design intentionally removes human-in-the-loop safety checks for communication, potentially amplifying the impact of injection or misinterpretation.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill allows users to reference threads directly by ID (#{id}). While intended for convenience, this capability could be used to access or interact with unauthorized conversation threads if thread IDs are predictable or discovered through other means.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 19, 2026, 02:08 PM