skills/spm1001/claude-suite/setup/Gen Agent Trust Hub

setup

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 19, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The skill performs git clones of multiple repositories from an untrusted GitHub user account (spm1001/claude-suite, spm1001/todoist-gtd, spm1001/claude-mem).
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): After cloning, the skill immediately executes code from these repositories, including Python scripts for authentication (todoist.py auth) and synchronization tools (uv run mem scan). There is no verification of the downloaded content before execution.
  • PERSISTENCE MECHANISMS (HIGH): The skill installs shell scripts into ~/.claude/hooks/ and ~/.claude/scripts/. These directories are typically used for session lifecycle hooks, meaning code from the untrusted repository will be automatically executed in future sessions.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill uses ln -sf to symlink arbitrary directories and scripts into the agent's configuration path, allowing the external repository to dictate which executable files are active in the environment.
  • INDIRECT PROMPT INJECTION (LOW): The installation of 'behavioral skills' and 'memory' tools creates a large attack surface where external data (like Todoist tasks or session history) can influence agent behavior. Evidence:
  • Ingestion points: ~/.claude/skills/mem (SKILL.md)
  • Boundary markers: None present in the setup script.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess calls (via scripts), network access (via todoist API), and file-write capabilities.
  • Sanitization: None detected in the setup process.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 19, 2026, 12:08 PM