handoff
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill's implementation logic for handling user messages is inherently unsafe. It directs the agent to execute a bash command using direct interpolation:
gt mail send <your-address> -s "HANDOFF: Session cycling" -m "<message>". This pattern is a classic shell injection vulnerability. An attacker can provide a message containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,"; rm -rf /; ") to terminate the intended command and execute arbitrary code on the host system. - REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): Because the
Bashtool is explicitly permitted for these operations in the YAML frontmatter, the lack of input sanitization provides a direct path for untrusted user input to reach a command execution sink. - PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): This skill exhibits a significant Indirect Prompt Injection surface (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: User-provided message string in the
/handoffcommand. - Boundary markers: None. The template uses simple double quotes which are easily escaped.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool to executegtcommands (as defined inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: None. The instructions do not specify any validation or escaping of the
<message>content before passing it to the shell.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata