skills/stvlynn/skills/tip-gui-skill/Gen Agent Trust Hub

tip-gui-skill

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill reads from the local file system at ~/Library/Application Support/Tip/settings.json, which contains sensitive authentication data including API keys and Bearer tokens for external model providers.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script tip_gui_bridge.py uses subprocess.run to execute Python snippets through a local virtual environment located at ~/service/youtu-tip/youtu-tip/python/.venv/bin/python. This allows for the execution of arbitrary Python logic on the host machine.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The describe command captures the current state of the user's desktop as a screenshot and transmits it, along with API keys extracted from local configuration, to external OpenAI-compatible endpoints. This transmits visual workspace data and associated secrets to remote servers.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface when processing screen content.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted visual data from the user's screen is captured via cmd_describe and converted to text by an LLM.
  • Boundary markers: There are no markers or safety instructions in the prompt template to prevent the model from following instructions embedded in the visual content (e.g., text on the desktop).
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands and automate GUI interactions (clicks, typing) which can be manipulated by injected instructions.
  • Sanitization: The description output derived from visual content is returned directly to the agent context without sanitization.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 29, 2026, 11:11 PM