ppt-agent
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automatically installs multiple software packages and binaries during its execution cycle.
- It uses
npm installto download and installpuppeteer,dom-to-svg, andesbuildat runtime within the script execution flow. - It triggers the download of the Chromium browser binary through Puppeteer's installation process.
- It uses
pip installto install Python libraries includingpython-pptx,lxml, andPillowduring the transformation pipeline step. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic code generation and subprocess calls to manage its processing workflow.
- Scripts
html2png.pyandhtml2svg.pygenerate temporary Node.js files containing logic for screenshotting and DOM manipulation, which are then executed viasubprocess.runusing thenoderuntime. - Subprocesses are used to invoke package managers (
npm,pip,npx) and system-level utilities (pdf2svg). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) due to its data ingestion and capability set.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from web search results (Step 2) and user-provided source materials (Step 1) directly into the agent's reasoning context.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or security instructions used to isolate external content from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including file system writes (
png2pptx.py), local file reads and base64 conversion of images (html2svg.py), and shell command execution through generated Node.js scripts. - Sanitization: No sanitization or safety-filtering is applied to external data before it is interpolated into prompts or used to drive code generation.
Audit Metadata