ppt-agent

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automatically installs multiple software packages and binaries during its execution cycle.
  • It uses npm install to download and install puppeteer, dom-to-svg, and esbuild at runtime within the script execution flow.
  • It triggers the download of the Chromium browser binary through Puppeteer's installation process.
  • It uses pip install to install Python libraries including python-pptx, lxml, and Pillow during the transformation pipeline step.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic code generation and subprocess calls to manage its processing workflow.
  • Scripts html2png.py and html2svg.py generate temporary Node.js files containing logic for screenshotting and DOM manipulation, which are then executed via subprocess.run using the node runtime.
  • Subprocesses are used to invoke package managers (npm, pip, npx) and system-level utilities (pdf2svg).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) due to its data ingestion and capability set.
  • Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from web search results (Step 2) and user-provided source materials (Step 1) directly into the agent's reasoning context.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or security instructions used to isolate external content from the agent's core instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including file system writes (png2pptx.py), local file reads and base64 conversion of images (html2svg.py), and shell command execution through generated Node.js scripts.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or safety-filtering is applied to external data before it is interpolated into prompts or used to drive code generation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 2, 2026, 04:04 PM