code-review
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses user-provided
$ARGUMENTS(PR numbers or URLs) directly in shell commands such asgh pr viewandgh pr diff. A malicious user could provide input containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,123; rm -rf /) to execute arbitrary commands on the system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads content from
gh pr view(PR titles/descriptions),gh issue view(Issue descriptions), and local files intmp/issues/which are likely populated from external data. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool, allowing for full shell command execution. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the fetched GitHub content is performed before processing.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses local files using a path constructed from user input (
tmp/issues/<issue-number>/). This pattern is vulnerable to path traversal attacks if the issue number is not strictly validated, potentially allowing the agent to read sensitive files outside the intended directory.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata