skills/tanabee/skills/code-review/Gen Agent Trust Hub

code-review

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses user-provided $ARGUMENTS (PR numbers or URLs) directly in shell commands such as gh pr view and gh pr diff. A malicious user could provide input containing shell metacharacters (e.g., 123; rm -rf /) to execute arbitrary commands on the system.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external sources.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads content from gh pr view (PR titles/descriptions), gh issue view (Issue descriptions), and local files in tmp/issues/ which are likely populated from external data.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash tool, allowing for full shell command execution.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the fetched GitHub content is performed before processing.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses local files using a path constructed from user input (tmp/issues/<issue-number>/). This pattern is vulnerable to path traversal attacks if the issue number is not strictly validated, potentially allowing the agent to read sensitive files outside the intended directory.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 16, 2026, 11:19 AM