create-pr-text
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface identified through the processing of untrusted data from GitHub. The skill fetches content from external issues (
gh issue view) and commit messages (git log), which could contain instructions intended to manipulate the agent's reasoning or output format. * Ingestion points: Issue body content fromgh issue viewand commit descriptions fromgit logandgit show(found in SKILL.md). * Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters or provide warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the fetched data. * Capability inventory: The skill has access toBash,Write, andReadtools, which could be abused if the agent is successfully manipulated by injected text. * Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the external content is specified. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Potential for command injection and path traversal via the
$ARGUMENTSparameter. The skill uses user-provided identifiers to execute shell commands (gh issue view) and to write files (tmp/issues/<issue番号>/pr.md). * Evidence: The issue identifier or URL passed in$ARGUMENTSis directly incorporated into shell commands and file system paths. If an attacker provides a malformed identifier containing shell metacharacters or directory traversal sequences (e.g.,../), it could lead to unauthorized command execution or writing to arbitrary file locations.
Audit Metadata