tavily-extract

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation provides an installation command (curl -fsSL https://cli.tavily.com/install.sh | bash) that downloads and executes a shell script directly from the vendor's official domain. While this is the intended setup method for the Tavily CLI, executing remote scripts via piped shell commands is a security best practice violation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the tvly command-line tool via a Bash interface to perform its operations. It supports writing extracted data to the local file system using the -o or --output flags.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to fetch and process content from arbitrary third-party URLs provided by the user.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from the web and presents it to the agent.
  • Ingestion points: Web content retrieved from URLs passed to the tvly extract command.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions are used to separate external content from the agent's system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash tool, which can execute the tvly CLI and write files to the local disk.
  • Sanitization: Content is processed into clean markdown, but there is no evidence of filtering or sanitizing the text to prevent embedded instructions from influencing the agent's behavior.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.tavily.com/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 17, 2026, 06:56 PM