start-session

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill processes untrusted external data in the form of a file path provided via $ARGUMENTS and explicitly instructs the agent to read and analyze its content.
  • Ingestion points: $ARGUMENTS variable, which accepts a 'file path' per the argument-hint.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not provide delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the file content it reads.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is granted Read, Write, and Glob tool permissions.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no logic to restrict the file path to a specific directory or to validate that the file content does not contain malicious instructions.
  • Data Exposure (HIGH): By allowing the Read tool to be used on an arbitrary path provided by the user, the skill enables the extraction of sensitive local data (e.g., ~/.ssh/id_rsa or .env files) into the agent's context and potentially into the session logs stored in .claude/learning-sessions/.
  • Persistence Mechanisms (LOW): The skill systematically writes to .claude/learning-sessions/index.json and creates new session files. While this is the intended functionality, it establishes a persistent footprint on the file system for every triggered session.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 04:38 AM