claude-tracker-suite
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts
new-session.shandresume-in-vscode.shutilize AppleScript (osascript) and the system clipboard (pbcopy/pbpaste) to automate GUI actions and execute arbitrary shell commands in Ghostty, VS Code, and Cursor. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]:scripts/bootstrap-claude-setup.jsperforms system modifications, including initializing git repositories usingchild_process.execSync. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill establishes persistence on macOS via alaunchdconfiguration (com.claude.tracker-watch.plist) that runs a monitoring daemon in the background. \n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]:scripts/new-session.shinvokes theclaudeCLI with user-defined prompts via the-pflag, which executes code within the Claude Agent SDK environment. \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on multiple external files that are not provided in the source code, including~/.claude/lib/tracker-utils.js,update-active-projects.py, andclaude-tracker-watch. This renders the skill's complete logic unverifiable. \n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Several scripts access and search sensitive data stored in~/.claude/projects/, including full conversation transcripts (.jsonl) and project metadata. \n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted session logs and is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. \n - Ingestion points:
search-sessions.jsanddetect-projects.jsread and parse.jsonltranscript files. \n - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or safety instructions are used when parsing historical session content. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands, write files, and spawn new agent sessions. \n
- Sanitization: Only basic pattern filtering for system logs is implemented, which is insufficient to prevent instruction injection from within session data.
Audit Metadata