rlama
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses
subprocess.runandsubprocess.Popenacross multiple scripts (rlama_manage.py,rlama_query.py,rlama_resilient.py, etc.) to interface with therlamaCLI andollamaservice. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: In
scripts/rlama_retrieve.py, thesynthesizefunction allows document chunks to be sent to external providers like OpenRouter and TogetherAI. This presents a data exposure risk as local knowledge base content is transmitted to cloud services. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its document ingestion and RAG pipeline. It reads arbitrary files and feeds them into LLM prompts without sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Local files via
rlama_resilient.pyandrlama_batch_ingest.py. - Boundary markers: Limited use of system prompt structure in
rlama_retrieve.pywithout strong delimiters. - Capability inventory: Execution of CLI tools and filesystem management (
shutil.rmtree). - Sanitization: No content filtering is applied prior to LLM processing.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Scripts make network requests to external APIs for LLM synthesis and embedding, including
openrouter.aiandtogether.xyz.
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