slack
Fail
Audited by Snyk on Mar 14, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis
CRITICAL E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
- Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 0.90). High-risk: the code intentionally grants automated model-driven tool access (includes "Bash", "WebFetch"/tools), uses permission_mode="bypassPermissions", and runs a persistent Socket Mode listener + auto-hooks that process untrusted Slack input into a session with resume/persistent memory (SQLite, logs, exportable user models), creating a stealthy channel that can execute shell tools, access local data, and exfiltrate information if abused.
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill's Session Bridge and daemon explicitly read Slack user-generated content (see SKILL.md and references/session-bridge.md: slack_listen.py → daemon/inbox.jsonl and claude_handler.py) and feed those untrusted DMs/@mentions into the agent for processing with full tool access, so third-party Slack messages can materially influence actions.
Issues (2)
E006
CRITICALMalicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
W011
MEDIUMThird-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
Audit Metadata