telnyx-twilio-migration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill orchestrates the migration by executing several local bash and Python scripts included in the package to perform project discovery, code linting, and validation.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddirects the agent to executebash {baseDir}/scripts/run-discovery.sh <project-root>andbash {baseDir}/scripts/run-validation.sh <project-root>. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions automate the installation of dependencies using package managers (
pip,npm,gem,go get) and communicate with the Telnyx API. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdPhase 3.2 provides commands for installing thetelnyxSDK across multiple languages. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes the user's existing source code during the discovery and migration phases.
- Ingestion points: Project files scanned by
run-discovery.shand read by the agent in Phase 4. - Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is not instructed to use specific delimiters or ignore instructions embedded in the project files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive permissions including file system modification, shell command execution via
bash, and network access viacurl. - Sanitization: Absent; the instructions do not specify any validation or sanitization of the content read from the project files.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill explicitly asks the user to provide their
TELNYX_API_KEYduring the prerequisite phase. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdStep 0.1 requests the user's API key to initialize the migration state.
Audit Metadata