skills/teamily-ai/skill-creator/docx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

docx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses subprocess.run to execute system commands including soffice, pandoc, and git. Most notably, scripts/office/soffice.py compiles an embedded C source shim at runtime using gcc and then utilizes the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to inject the resulting library into the soffice process. This is used to manage AF_UNIX socket behavior in restricted environments.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: SKILL.md specifies the installation of the docx package from the public npm registry.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface as it processes untrusted document content.
  • Ingestion points: Document XML content is read and parsed from .docx archives in scripts/office/unpack.py.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specific instructions or delimiters used to ensure the agent ignores instructions found within the document data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege capabilities including arbitrary command execution (subprocess.run), runtime compilation (gcc), and extensive file system access.
  • Sanitization: The skill utilizes defusedxml to protect against standard XML vulnerabilities like XXE, though some metadata extraction scripts use the non-hardened xml.etree.ElementTree library.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 01:33 AM