The Agent Skills Directory

[PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from the repository and user-provided tasks without safety controls. 1. Ingestion points: User-provided <TASK> in Phase 1 and Phase 1F prompts, and all repository files scanned during context gathering. 2. Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters or 'ignore instructions' warnings when interpolating data into prompts. 3. Capability inventory: File system write access (modifying source code), command execution (via codex exec), and project build execution (via cmake). 4. Sanitization: Absent. No input validation or escaping is performed on ingested data before it is passed to agents.
[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands to facilitate its workflow, including directory listing (ls) in Phase 0 and project builds (cmake --build ./out --config Debug --target Telegram) in Phase 5. It relies on the codex exec tool to dynamically execute model-generated implementation plans.

task-think