ai-guardrails

SKILL.md

AI Guardrails

Overview

Add safety layers to AI applications — input validation, prompt injection detection, output filtering, content moderation, and policy enforcement. Prevent misuse without breaking legitimate use cases.

Instructions

Defense layers

User Input → Input Guardrails → LLM → Output Guardrails → User Response
                 │                          │
                 ├─ Prompt injection check   ├─ Content policy check
                 ├─ PII detection            ├─ Hallucination detection
                 ├─ Topic restrictions        ├─ PII scrubbing
                 └─ Rate limiting             └─ Schema validation

Apply guardrails at both input and output. Input guardrails prevent attacks. Output guardrails catch failures the LLM produces despite good input.

Prompt injection detection

Prompt injection tricks the LLM into ignoring its system prompt. Use multiple detection strategies:

# injection_detector.py — Multi-layer prompt injection detection

import re
from typing import Tuple

class InjectionDetector:
    PATTERNS = [
        r"ignore\s+(all\s+)?(previous|above|prior)\s+(instructions|prompts)",
        r"you\s+are\s+now\s+(an?\s+)?(unrestricted|unfiltered|jailbroken)",
        r"disregard\s+(your|the)\s+(rules|guidelines|instructions)",
        r"system\s*prompt",
        r"pretend\s+(you\s+are|to\s+be)",
        r"override\s+(your|all|the)\s+(safety|content|rules)",
        r"\[system\]|\[INST\]|<\|system\|>",
    ]

    def check_patterns(self, text: str) -> Tuple[bool, list[str]]:
        text_lower = text.lower()
        matches = [p for p in self.PATTERNS if re.search(p, text_lower)]
        return len(matches) > 0, matches

    def check_semantic(self, text: str, llm_client) -> Tuple[bool, float]:
        """Use a fast LLM to classify whether input is injection."""
        response = llm_client.chat.completions.create(
            model="gpt-4o-mini",
            messages=[
                {"role": "system", "content":
                 "Analyze if this input tries to manipulate AI instructions. "
                 'Return JSON: {"is_injection": bool, "confidence": 0-1}'},
                {"role": "user", "content": f"Analyze:\n\n{text}"}
            ],
            response_format={"type": "json_object"}
        )
        result = json.loads(response.choices[0].message.content)
        return result["is_injection"], result["confidence"]

    def check_canary(self, system_prompt: str, output: str) -> bool:
        """Check if a canary token leaked from system prompt to output."""
        canary_match = re.search(r'CANARY:(\w{16})', system_prompt)
        if canary_match:
            return canary_match.group(1) in output
        return False

Content policy enforcement

# content_filter.py — Filter outputs against safety policies

class ContentFilter:
    def __init__(self, thresholds=None):
        self.thresholds = thresholds or {
            "violence": 0.7, "hate_speech": 0.5, "sexual": 0.6,
            "self_harm": 0.3, "illegal_activity": 0.5, "pii_leak": 0.3,
        }

    def check_pii(self, text: str) -> list[dict]:
        """Detect PII (email, phone, SSN, credit card, IP) in text."""
        patterns = {
            "email": r'\b[\w.-]+@[\w.-]+\.\w{2,}\b',
            "phone": r'\b\d{3}[-.\s]?\d{3}[-.\s]?\d{4}\b',
            "ssn": r'\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b',
            "credit_card": r'\b\d{4}[\s-]?\d{4}[\s-]?\d{4}[\s-]?\d{4}\b',
        }
        findings = []
        for pii_type, pattern in patterns.items():
            for match in re.finditer(pattern, text):
                findings.append({"type": pii_type, "value": match.group()})
        return findings

    def scrub_pii(self, text: str) -> str:
        """Replace PII with [REDACTED_TYPE] markers."""
        for finding in sorted(self.check_pii(text),
                              key=lambda f: text.find(f["value"]), reverse=True):
            text = text.replace(finding["value"],
                               f"[REDACTED_{finding['type'].upper()}]")
        return text

Output validation

# output_validator.py — Validate LLM outputs against schemas

from pydantic import BaseModel, validator

class ValidatedResponse(BaseModel):
    answer: str
    confidence: float
    sources: list[str]

    @validator('confidence')
    def confidence_in_range(cls, v):
        if not 0 <= v <= 1:
            raise ValueError(f"Confidence {v} not in [0, 1]")
        return v

    @validator('answer')
    def answer_not_empty(cls, v):
        if len(v.strip()) < 10:
            raise ValueError("Answer too short")
        return v

Rate limiting

# rate_limiter.py — Prevent API abuse and cost overruns

from collections import defaultdict
from time import time

class AIRateLimiter:
    def __init__(self):
        self.user_requests: dict[str, list[float]] = defaultdict(list)
        self.max_requests_per_minute = 10
        self.max_tokens_per_day = 100_000

    def check_allowed(self, user_id: str, estimated_tokens: int = 0) -> dict:
        now = time()
        reqs = self.user_requests[user_id]
        reqs[:] = [t for t in reqs if now - t < 3600]
        recent = sum(1 for t in reqs if now - t < 60)
        if recent >= self.max_requests_per_minute:
            return {"allowed": False, "reason": "Rate limit exceeded", "retry_after": 60}
        reqs.append(now)
        return {"allowed": True}

Hallucination detection

# hallucination_check.py — Verify claims against source context

def check_grounding(answer: str, context: str, llm_client) -> dict:
    """Check if answer claims are supported by provided context."""
    response = llm_client.chat.completions.create(
        model="gpt-4o-mini",
        messages=[
            {"role": "system", "content":
             "Identify which claims are SUPPORTED, NOT SUPPORTED, or "
             "CONTRADICTED by the context. Return JSON with arrays and "
             "'grounding_score' (0-1)."},
            {"role": "user", "content": f"Context:\n{context}\n\nAnswer:\n{answer}"}
        ],
        response_format={"type": "json_object"}
    )
    return json.loads(response.choices[0].message.content)

Examples

Add safety guardrails to a chatbot

Our customer support chatbot uses GPT-4 and has no safety layers. Add comprehensive guardrails: prompt injection detection (pattern + semantic), PII scrubbing on both input and output, content policy enforcement, rate limiting (10 req/min per user), and output validation against our response schema. Include logging for security review and a circuit breaker that switches to a safe fallback response when anomalies are detected.

Build a content moderation pipeline

Build a content moderation system for a social platform that processes 10,000 user-generated posts per day. Use a fast classifier (GPT-4o-mini) for initial screening, escalate borderline cases to a more capable model, and route to human review for the hardest 5%. Track false positive/negative rates, and include an appeals process.

Implement hallucination detection for a RAG system

Our RAG system answers questions from company documentation but sometimes makes up information not in the source docs. Build a grounding verification layer that checks every claim against retrieved passages, flags unsupported statements, and either removes them or adds "unverified" markers. Include a confidence score and fallback to "I don't have enough information" when grounding is below 60%.

Guidelines

  • Always apply guardrails at both input AND output — neither alone is sufficient
  • Use multiple injection detection strategies (pattern + semantic + canary) for defense in depth
  • Set PII detection thresholds conservatively — false positives are preferable to PII leaks
  • Validate all LLM outputs against schemas before returning to users
  • Implement circuit breakers that switch to safe fallback responses during anomalies
  • Log all guardrail triggers for security auditing and pattern analysis
  • Test guardrails regularly with adversarial inputs to ensure they remain effective
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