blender-scripting

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent on how to execute the Blender binary headlessly using flags such as --background and --python. This is the standard method for running automated scripts in a 3D pipeline and does not involve unauthorized command execution.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The provided code snippets demonstrate reading and writing 3D asset files (.blend, .obj, .fbx, .glb) on the local filesystem. These operations are restricted to project-specific directories (e.g., /tmp/exports) and do not target sensitive system files or attempt to transmit data over the network.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it iterates through and prints object names and metadata from external .blend files. A maliciously crafted 3D file could contain instruction-like strings that an agent might erroneously follow if it processes the terminal output without sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: The skill uses bpy.ops.wm.open_mainfile to load external data and bpy.data.objects to read object properties.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instruction-bypass warnings are used in the example templates.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses filesystem write capabilities (os.makedirs, bpy.ops.wm.save_as_mainfile) and external process execution (Blender CLI).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for data read from the files before it is printed to the standard output.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 9, 2026, 07:33 AM