logo-studio
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to run shell commands like
open,xdg-open, orstartto display the generated results. Because the filename is built using the user-provided brand name, this creates a potential command injection vector if the input is not sanitized.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Theassets/gallery-template.htmlfile links to Google Fonts atfonts.googleapis.com. This is an external reference to a well-known service used for the skill's typographic functionality.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection through user inputs during the brand discovery phase.\n - Ingestion points: Discovery Interview inputs in
SKILL.md(e.g., brand name, values).\n - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to use delimiters or safety guards for user-controlled content.\n
- Capability inventory: File writing and shell command execution (
open,xdg-open,start) as described inSKILL.md.\n - Sanitization: No validation or escaping is specified for user data used in filenames or shell commands.
Audit Metadata