temporal
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents architectural patterns for AI agent loops and LLM pipelines (in
references/ai-patterns.md) that ingest untrusted data, such as user-provided goals, conversation history, and tool execution outputs. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious content in processed data could attempt to influence the agent's orchestration logic or activity execution. - Ingestion points: Workflow state (
state.goal), conversation history arrays, and tool response data inai-patterns.mdandreferences/typescript-sdk.md. - Boundary markers: The provided code templates do not demonstrate the use of delimiters or specific instructions to the LLM to ignore embedded commands within ingested variables.
- Capability inventory: The documented workflows have the capability to execute activities that perform network operations (using
AsyncAnthropic,OpenAI, orfetch), execute arbitrary tools, and interact with external storage. - Sanitization: The patterns do not explicitly include sanitization, validation, or escaping of external content before it is interpolated into LLM prompts or processed by tool-dispatching logic.
Audit Metadata