mcp-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The evaluation script
scripts/evaluation.pyand the connection logic inscripts/connections.pyfacilitate the execution of local commands via thestdiotransport. This functionality is the primary mechanism for testing MCP servers and allows the agent to spawn subprocesses based on user-provided parameters. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's evaluation harness is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection from the results of the tools it calls.
- Ingestion points: Data from external tool results is ingested into the conversation history in the
agent_loopfunction withinscripts/evaluation.py. - Boundary markers: The system prompt uses XML tags to structure agent responses but does not include explicit delimiters or instructions to the model to ignore potential commands embedded in tool outputs.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses the capability to invoke any tool registered by the server under test, which may include file and network operations.
- Sanitization: Tool responses are converted to strings and incorporated into the prompt without validation or filtering.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in
SKILL.mdsuggests fetching the latest MCP protocol and SDK specifications from official sources includingmodelcontextprotocol.ioand the Model Context Protocol GitHub repositories.
Audit Metadata