timeline-report
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple bash commands to identify the project environment and fetch data.
- Uses
git rev-parseto detect worktrees and resolve parent project paths. - Uses
curlto fetch the complete project timeline from a local worker service athttp://localhost:37777/api/context/inject. - Executes
sqlite3 ~/.claude-mem/claude-mem.dbto run analytical queries on the project's memory database. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses a sensitive local database path containing the project's persistent memory.
- Sensitive Path: Accesses
~/.claude-mem/claude-mem.db, which stores observations, code snippets, and development history. - The data is processed locally by the agent to generate a report, but users should be aware that all historical data recorded by
claude-memis exposed to the analysis agent. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the project timeline data.
- Ingestion points: The full timeline fetched via
curland database query results are injected directly into the subagent's prompt ([TIMELINE CONTENT GOES HERE]). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks robust boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions to prevent the agent from obeying malicious instructions that might be embedded within the recorded project observations.
- Capability inventory: The subagent has the capability to write files to the local file system (
./journey-into-PROJECT_NAME.md) and execute SQL queries. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering of the timeline content before it is passed to the analysis agent.
Audit Metadata