bankr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several shell scripts (
bankr.sh,bankr-submit.sh,bankr-status.sh, andbankr-cancel.sh) to interface with its core service. These scripts rely on the local presence ofcurlfor networking andjqfor secure JSON processing and construction. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: All network operations are directed to the vendor's official API at
https://api.bankr.bot. This endpoint is used for submitting natural language prompts and polling for the status of asynchronous jobs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: An indirect prompt injection attack surface exists due to the combination of untrusted data ingestion and powerful tool capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The skill retrieves and processes content from external environments that may be attacker-controlled, such as NFT collection metadata from OpenSea (
references/nft-operations.md), event descriptions from Polymarket (references/polymarket.md), and social metrics during market research. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or specific 'ignore-embedded-instructions' warnings in the provided logic to prevent the agent from accidentally obeying instructions found within these external data sources.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses significant capabilities, including cross-chain token transfers, liquidity provision, and the execution of arbitrary raw transactions with custom calldata on EVM-compatible chains.
- Sanitization: While the skill correctly uses
jqto sanitize the user's initial prompt for JSON transport, it lacks a mechanism to filter or sanitize potential instructions embedded in the data returned by the API before that data influences the agent's next action.
Audit Metadata