bankr

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several shell scripts (bankr.sh, bankr-submit.sh, bankr-status.sh, and bankr-cancel.sh) to interface with its core service. These scripts rely on the local presence of curl for networking and jq for secure JSON processing and construction.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: All network operations are directed to the vendor's official API at https://api.bankr.bot. This endpoint is used for submitting natural language prompts and polling for the status of asynchronous jobs.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: An indirect prompt injection attack surface exists due to the combination of untrusted data ingestion and powerful tool capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: The skill retrieves and processes content from external environments that may be attacker-controlled, such as NFT collection metadata from OpenSea (references/nft-operations.md), event descriptions from Polymarket (references/polymarket.md), and social metrics during market research.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or specific 'ignore-embedded-instructions' warnings in the provided logic to prevent the agent from accidentally obeying instructions found within these external data sources.
  • Capability inventory: The agent possesses significant capabilities, including cross-chain token transfers, liquidity provision, and the execution of arbitrary raw transactions with custom calldata on EVM-compatible chains.
  • Sanitization: While the skill correctly uses jq to sanitize the user's initial prompt for JSON transport, it lacks a mechanism to filter or sanitize potential instructions embedded in the data returned by the API before that data influences the agent's next action.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 05:13 AM