agent-browser
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes an
evalcommand that allows the execution of arbitrary JavaScript within the browser instance. This capability can be used to bypass client-side security, interact with internal page data, or perform unauthorized actions on behalf of the user. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill supports opening local files via the
file://protocol when the--allow-file-accessflag is enabled. This provides a vector for an agent to read sensitive local configuration files, documents, or SSH keys and potentially extract them through the browser. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: As a tool designed to process and summarize content from the open web, the skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Malicious instructions hidden on a webpage (e.g., in HTML comments or zero-width characters) could be ingested by the agent and used to hijack its behavior. Evidence: Ingestion points include
snapshotandget textcommands; capability inventory includes file writes and network access (SKILL.md). - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation and templates (e.g.,
templates/authenticated-session.sh) suggest handling authentication by passing credentials via environment variables or CLI arguments. This can lead to sensitive information being leaked in shell histories or system process logs. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill workflow frequently utilizes
npxto run theagent-browserpackage directly from the NPM registry. While NPM is a well-known service, this involves the dynamic download and execution of code at runtime.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata