codex-upcoming-features
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a surface for indirect prompt injection as it summarizes potentially untrusted data from external repositories. \n
- Ingestion points: The script
scripts/summarize_upcoming.pyingests text from git commit subjects, pull request titles via the GitHub API, and specific Rust source files within the analyzed repository. \n - Boundary markers: The output markdown and JSON reports do not utilize explicit delimiters or specialized instructions to distinguish untrusted summary content from agent directives. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to execute git and GitHub CLI commands and perform file system read operations. \n
- Sanitization: Input text is normalized for casing and whitespace, though it is not formally sanitized against malicious instructions embedded in commit or source data. \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Synchronizes repository data from a remote source. \n
- The skill clones and pulls data from GitHub (specifically targeting
openai/codexby default). GitHub is recognized as a well-known technology service, and the download finding is documented neutrally. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Invokes system binaries to perform analysis and fetch metadata. \n - The skill uses
subprocess.runto call thegitandghbinaries. The implementation follows security best practices by using list-based arguments and avoiding shell execution (shell=True), which mitigates command injection risks.
Audit Metadata