tldraw-desktop

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions explicitly use curl commands to interact with a local web service on localhost:7236, enabling network-based interaction with the host system.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages the /api/doc/:id/exec endpoint, which is designed to execute arbitrary JavaScript code within the context of the tldraw desktop application. This provides a direct path for dynamic code execution.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The README directs the user to install the skill via npx from a third-party GitHub repository (jsh-me/tldraw-desktop-skill), introducing external code that has not been verified.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by reading shape labels and text data from the tldraw canvas.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data is retrieved from the canvas via GET /api/doc/:id/shapes in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to disregard embedded commands are included in the prompt instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can execute commands via curl, run arbitrary JavaScript through the /api/doc/:id/exec endpoint, and capture visual data using /api/doc/:id/screenshot (documented in SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the text content retrieved from the canvas is mentioned or implemented.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a discrepancy between the provided author context ('tmdgusya') and the repository/package owner ('jsh-me') found in the skill metadata and documentation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 18, 2026, 05:16 AM