tldraw-desktop
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions explicitly use
curlcommands to interact with a local web service onlocalhost:7236, enabling network-based interaction with the host system. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages the
/api/doc/:id/execendpoint, which is designed to execute arbitrary JavaScript code within the context of the tldraw desktop application. This provides a direct path for dynamic code execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The README directs the user to install the skill via
npxfrom a third-party GitHub repository (jsh-me/tldraw-desktop-skill), introducing external code that has not been verified. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by reading shape labels and text data from the tldraw canvas.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is retrieved from the canvas via
GET /api/doc/:id/shapesinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to disregard embedded commands are included in the prompt instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute commands via
curl, run arbitrary JavaScript through the/api/doc/:id/execendpoint, and capture visual data using/api/doc/:id/screenshot(documented inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the text content retrieved from the canvas is mentioned or implemented.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a discrepancy between the provided author context ('tmdgusya') and the repository/package owner ('jsh-me') found in the skill metadata and documentation.
Audit Metadata